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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Sabina Hallam appeals from the judgment entered upon her guilty plea to 
one count of grand theft by unauthorized control.  Hallam also appeals the district 
court’s order awarding restitution. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In February of 2011, Hallam was hired to take care of Anne Muller and 
Ms. Muller’s father, Paul DeFermery.  (PSI pp. 2, 68.)  Ms. Muller was in her 70s 
and had Parkinson’s disease, and Mr. DeFermery was in his 90s, and had been 
diagnosed with dementia.1  (PSI, p. 3; 08/28/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 24 – p. 8, L. 19.)  As 
a result, Ms. Muller hired Hallam “to help with bill paying, shopping, 
transportation for doctor visits, and any other needs that required driving or a 
steady hand.”  (PSI, p. 33.)  Ms. Muller paid Hallam “approximately $400.00 per 
month as a care provider” and Hallam was “allowed to use [Ms. Muller’s] vehicle,” 
and Hallam was also allowed to use Ms. Muller’s credit cards to make purchases 
for Muller “family needs.”  (PSI, pp. 2, 33.)  But the credit cards were not to be 
used for “Ms. Hallam’s needs”; Ms. Muller authorized Hallam to use the cards for 
Hallam’s own expenses “only for an emergency when [Hallam] had gone on 
vacation.”  (PSI, pp. 2, 33.) 
                                            
1 The record alternately refers to Mr. DeFermery’s diagnosis as either 
Alzheimer’s disease or age-related dementia.  (See, e.g. 08/28/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 24 
– p. 8, L. 8.) 
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 Hallam proceeded to use Ms. Muller’s credit cards to make numerous 
unauthorized purchases for herself, over a period of 17 months.2  
(Aug. pp. 16-17; 08/28/15 Tr., p. 30, L. 3 – p. 31, L. 7.)  Although the exact 
amount of Hallam’s embezzlement is contested on appeal, Hallam admitted that 
her “personal use was around two to three thousand [dollars]….”3  (PSI, pp. 5-6.)  
Law enforcement ultimately concluded that Hallam’s unauthorized use of the 
card was in a range of $30,787 to $34,867.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 9-16; 
Aug. p. 8.) 
 The state charged Hallam with five counts of grand theft by unauthorized 
control.  (R., pp. 17-21.)  Hallam pleaded guilty to Count V, and the district court 
dismissed the remaining counts.  (11/26/14 Tr., p. 12, L. 10 – p. 14, L.5; 
R., pp. 51-52.)  The district court sentenced Hallam to five years prison with three 
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (01/23/15 Tr., p. 16, L. 11 – p. 17, L. 6.)  
The district court also ordered restitution in an amount of $34,087, which Hallam 
objected to.  (R., pp. 5, 49-50.)  Hallam timely appealed, creating case number 
43035.  (R., pp. 57-59.)  After completing her rider, Hallam was placed on 
probation for four years.  (Aug. p. 1.) 
The district court then held a hearing on Hallam’s prior objection to the 
original restitution order.  (08/28/15 Tr.)  It considered evidence in the court file, 
                                            
2 Whether Hallam used one credit card or multiple credit cards is a contested fact 
on appeal.  (PSI, p. 4.) 
3 Hallam qualified this statement in the PSI by noting that “part of that was paid 
because I was making payments to [Ms. Muller].”  (PSI, p. 5.)  In any event, 
Hallam pleaded guilty to a count of grand theft that alleged she made $4,000 
worth of unauthorized transactions with Ms. Muller’s credit card.  (11/26/14 Tr., p. 
12, L. 10 – p. 14, L.5.) 
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heard testimony from three witnesses, and denied Hallam’s objection to the 
restitution order.  (08/28/15 Tr.; Aug. p. 10.)  The district court thereafter entered 
its Final Order of Restitution, in the amount of $30,787.  (Supp. R., pp. 11-13.)  
Hallam timely appealed, creating case number 43737, which this Court 
consolidated with the original appeal.  (Supp. R., pp. 14-16.)
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ISSUES 
 
 Hallam states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it retained 
jurisdiction rather than place Ms. Hallam on probation? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded 
restitution? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Is Hallam’s challenge to the retained jurisdiction moot because she 
is currently on probation? 
 
2. Has Hallam failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding restitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Hallam’s Challenge To The Retained Jurisdiction Is Moot Because She Is 
Currently On Probation 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 On appeal, Hallam argues that the district court erred when it retained 
jurisdiction, “rather than place her [on] probation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  This 
argument is moot because Hallam is currently on probation.  To the extent 
Hallam challenges the length of probation term, she has not shown that the 
district court’s probation order was unreasonable.   As a result, Hallam has failed 
to show that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing her.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Courts freely review “justiciability issues of ripeness and mootness” on 
appeal.  State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005). 
 Where a sentence is not illegal, the defendant has the burden to show that 
it is unreasonable, and thus, a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Brown, 121 
Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992); State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 
768 P.2d 1331, 1337 (1989).  
 
C. Whether The District Court Erred In Retaining Jurisdiction As Opposed To 
Ordering Probation Is Moot, Because Hallam Is Currently On Probation 
 
“An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief.”  State v. 
Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted).  “A case is 
moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have 
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no practical effect upon the outcome.”  In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337, 340, 179 P.3d 
300, 303 (2008) (quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. of County Comm’rs, 133 
Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000)). The mootness doctrine precludes 
review when “the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally 
cognizable interest in the outcome.”  Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. 
Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting 
Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)). 
Hallam “asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it retained 
jurisdiction rather than place her [on] probation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  This 
issue is moot, because, as Hallam acknowledges in her briefing, she is now on 
probation.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5; Aug. pp. 1-2.)  Regardless of whether the 
district court erred by retaining jurisdiction initially, Hallam is now on probation, 
and the explicitly claimed error—retaining jurisdiction—is no longer “capable of 
being concluded by judicial relief.”  An order requiring Hallam to be placed on 
probation now would likewise have “no practical effect on the outcome” of her 
sentence, because as a current probationer, she already enjoys the relief that 
she requests. Hallam’s challenge to the district court’s decision to retain 
jurisdiction is therefore moot.  
 
D. Hallam Has Not Met Her Burden Of Showing That A Four-Year Term Of 
Probation Is Unreasonable, And Thus Fails To Show That The District 
Court Erred In Ordering Probation 
 
Hallam’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by retaining 
jurisdiction is moot.  However, Hallam argues that “the district court abused its 
discretion by retain[ing] jurisdiction rather than placing Ms. Hallam on 
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probation for a period of three years.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6 (emphasis 
added).)  To the extent Hallam is challenging the four-year term of her probation, 
this argument fails, because the district court did not abuse its discretion. 
A sentencing court “has broad discretion with regard to probation.” 
State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 486, 959 P.2d 465, 467 (Ct. App. 1998).   
Accordingly, a district court can “prescribe the length of probation, the terms and 
conditions of probation, when probation may be revoked and when the defendant 
may receive early release.”  Id.  
 The court pointed out that the victims here—who were elderly, cognitively 
impaired, and needed daily help—were essentially Hallam’s “wards” who trusted 
her as a “caregiver,” and that she “took advantage of that” when she stole from 
them.  (01/23/15 Tr., p. 15, L. 1 – p. 16, L. 12.)  A longer term of probation would 
naturally address the district court’s concern for society and its “most vulnerable 
adults,” and would therefore be well within the court’s discretion.  Moreover, 
given the amount of restitution that Hallam owes, an extra year of probation 
makes at least practical sense; it gives her more time to pay her multi-thousand-
dollar debt, and makes it more likely that her victims will be compensated.  Given 
the district court’s findings at sentencing, the court had ample justification to 
order four years of probation as opposed to three, and doing so was within its 
broad discretion. 
Hallam has not shown why a four-year probation term is unreasonable 
here.  She points to the plea agreement, in which the State agreed not to seek 
more than three years of probation at sentencing.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  But 
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the district court was not bound to follow that recommendation, and the court 
explained this to Hallam, and she nevertheless decided to plead guilty.  I.C.R. 
11(c)(5), 11(f)(1)(B); (11/26/14 Tr., p. 8, L. 24 – p. 9, L. 2.)  Hallam also cites to 
her claims of contrition and remorse, but does not explain how these factors put 
the district court’s sentence outside the bounds of its broad discretion.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  Given that Hallam is now on probation for four years, if 
she argues that the court should have ordered three years instead, her burden is 
to explain how one additional year of probation would somehow transmute an 
agreed-upon, unchallenged sentence, into a sentence that is unreasonable.  She 
has not done so. 
Thus, insofar as Hallam argues that the district court abused its discretion 
by ordering four years of probation, or requests on appeal that her probation term 
be shortened to three years, her argument fails. 
II.   
Hallam Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Awarding Restitution 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 During the restitution hearing the district court considered the prosecutor’s 
affidavit of restitution and supporting documents, and heard two state’s 
witnesses.  (08/28/15 Tr., pp. 1-61.)  Connie Brandau testified regarding her 
discussions with Ms. Muller and the records they reviewed, and Gary Peer 
testified about investigating the unauthorized charges.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 3-61.)  
Hallam called one witness, who also worked for Ms. Muller, and who testified 
regarding purchases she thought Hallam made at Ms. Muller’s behest.  (08/28/15 
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Tr., pp. 62-72.)  Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, the district court 
awarded $30,787 in restitution.  (Aug. pp. 4-8; Supp. R., pp. 11-13.) 
Hallam claims the restitution award is “not based on substantial, 
competent evidence.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  She argues that the district court 
relied on the conclusions of one witness to calculate restitution, and argues those 
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, and are speculative. 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9, 11–13.)  She accordingly contends that “the restitution 
award must be vacated.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) 
 These arguments fail, because in addition to the fact- and opinion-based 
testimony of Mr. Peer, the district court considered documentary evidence and 
the testimony of Ms. Brandau in making its decision. Further, Mr. Peer’s 
conclusions were not speculative, but were based on credit card statements, 
receipts, multiple in-person interviews, a statistical report, and his own expertise 
and experience. As a result, the district court had substantial evidence that 
justified the restitution award, and Hallam fails to show otherwise on appeal. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is 
committed to the trial court’s sound discretion.”  State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 
296 P.3d 412, 417 (Ct. App. 2013).  The trial court’s factual findings in relation to 
restitution will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.  State v. 
Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 
Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011).   
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In considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court 
“conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine” whether the trial court (1) “correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion”; (2) “acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it”; and (3) “reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State 
v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 169, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State 
v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
 
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court’s Restitution Award 
 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) allows a court to “order a defendant found guilty 
of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to 
the victim.”  For purposes of Idaho’s restitution statute, a “victim” includes any 
“person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the 
defendant’s criminal conduct,” and “economic loss” includes, among other things, 
“the value of property taken.”  I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a), (e)(i).  Accordingly, for such 
an order “to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection between the 
conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the 
victim.”  Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401.   
Courts will not disturb a restitution award so long as it is supported by 
substantial evidence.  Id.  “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.”  Straub, 153 Idaho at 
885, 292 P.3d at 276. 
Substantial evidence supported the district court’s restitution award here. 
Before the hearing even began, the district court had already reviewed “in excess 
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of 50 pages of documentation”4 that supported the original Order of Restitution 
and that apparently contained at least some of Mr. Peer’s calculations.  (08/28/15 
Tr., p. 1, L. 11 – p. 2, L. 2, p. 37, L. 4 – p. 38, L. 23.)  The district court also heard 
testimony from Connie Brandau, an experienced bookkeeper and former deputy 
treasurer who analyzed Ms. Muller’s books, discussed the fraudulent charges 
with her, and obtained “paper copies of everything from the bank, bank 
statements on two or three different accounts and the credit card statements” 
relating to Hallam’s use of Ms. Muller’s credit cards.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 5-24, 
p. 10, L. 3 – p. 12, L. 10.)  Based on her review of those records, Ms. Brandau 
confirmed that myriad suspicious purchases—from ferret food, to bikini 
underwear, to lobster and beer—were not authorized by Ms. Muller.  (08/28/15 
Tr., p. 10, L. 23 – p. 12, L. 10.)  Ms. Brandau estimated that Hallam had used the 
credit cards for “$35,000 worth of purchases over and above those that were 
made for [the Muller family’s] benefit.”  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 15, L. 23 – p. 16, L. 11.)  
This testimony, standing alone, justifies an award of up to $35,000. 
Mr. Peer, an Owyhee County Sheriff’s Office reserve deputy and former 
CPA, testified regarding the investigation and his methodology.  
(08/28/15 Tr., p. 27, L. 23 – p. 30, L. 2.)  Mr. Peer testified that he prepared a 
“Restitution Memo” explaining the unauthorized charges, and that memo was 
admitted into evidence at the hearing without objection.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 
                                            
4 This appears to be a reference to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, which, aside from the PSI, 
is the only 50-plus page exhibit in the record on appeal. This exhibit contains 
credit card statements for Ms. Muller that cover the entire 17-month time period 
that Mr. Peer and Ms. Brandau testified to at the restitution hearing.  (Plaintiff’s 
Exhibit 2.) 
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12-19, p., 34, Ls. 21-24; Aug. pp. 16-17.)  Mr. Peer testified that to prepare his 
memo he analyzed, among other things, 17 months’ worth of credit card charges 
that he attributed to Hallam, showing a total amount of $49,194.23 in charges.  
(08/28/15 Tr., p. 30, L. 10 – p. 31, L. 7, p. 43, L. 23 – p. 44, L. 1, p. 44, Ls. 17-
22.)  Mr. Peer divided those charges into two categories: 1) “identified” 
purchases, which were “specific items identified as not for the Muller household”; 
and, 2) “food and sundry items,” which were “unidentified” purchases that could 
have been arguably attributed to either Hallam as unauthorized purchases, or to 
Hallam as legitimate purchases made on the Muller family’s behalf. (Aug. p. 16; 
08/28/15 Tr., p. 34, L. 21 – p. 35, L. 6.) 
Mr. Peer obtained receipts—not just credit card statements, but actual 
merchant receipts—for approximately $45,000 worth of those purchases, and 
“went through the receipts on [his] own.” (08/28/15 Tr., p. 33, L. 24 – p. 34, L. 6, 
p. 44, L. 23 – p. 46, L. 20, p. 49, L. 25 – p. 50, L.4.)  Lastly, Mr. Peer testified that 
he interviewed Ms. Muller three times, and during those interviews, went through 
items he “thought were suspect” with her. (08/28/15 Tr., p. 49, L. 25 – p. 52, L. 
20.)  When pressed on this point, Mr. Peer explained that: “I can’t remember 
specifically every [computer electronic item] I asked about. But I did ask about—
any item that I saw that stuck out as being $10 or more, let’s say, I would take a 
look at and then check on with her.”  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 50, Ls. 17-22.)  Mr. Peer 
explained that he “determined the charges that [he] believed were not for her,” 
and did so “either through logic or through specifically talking to Ms. Muller….”  
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(08/28/15 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 6-11, p. 48, L. 25 – p. 49, L. 2.)  He further explained that 
logic as follows: 
Q. [from Hallam’s counsel] “… So is it safe to say on some of the 
items you would ask Ms. Muller whether or not she used the 
item. If she stated she didn’t use the item, then any other 
time you saw that it was purchased you attributed it to Ms. 
Hallam?” 
A. [from Mr. Peer] Yes. 
 
(08/28/15 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 5-10.) In other words, Mr. Peer stated, “[a] classic 
example would be cigarettes. [Ms. Muller] doesn’t smoke. So that kind of thing if I 
would see a charge at a Tobacco Connection I would not treat that as an 
appropriate charge for Ms. Muller.”  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 12-22.)  In sum, with 
respect to these identifiable expenses, Mr. Peer concluded that Hallam was 
responsible for $21,701 worth of unauthorized purchases.  (Aug. p. 17; 08/28/15 
Tr., p. 37, Ls. 7-12.)  
The district court also heard Mr. Peer’s analysis of “unidentifiable” items—
that is, “[t]he items that [he] couldn’t identify either through logic or through 
specifically talking to Ms. Muller,” as explained above.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 48, L. 25 
– p. 49, L. 2.)  To allocate these purchases, Mr. Peer first excluded items that 
Ms. Muller identified as legitimate, and excluded authorized travel purchases.  
(08/28/15 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 2-13, p. 40, L. 13 – p. 41, L. 16.)  To estimate the portion 
of remaining food and sundry purchases attributable to Hallam, Mr. Peer used 
the following “apportioning methodology”: he crosschecked the Bureau of Labor 
statistics for the average monthly food expenditure of a family of two in 2011 
through 2012; he adjusted that figure to reflect that Ms. Muller and her father did 
not go out to eat; he estimated what two persons, like himself and his wife, might 
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spend on sundries and miscellaneous items; and to account for any error, he 
gave himself a “fudge factor” of 150%, which increased the amount potentially 
attributed to the Muller family.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 38, L. 10 – p. 41, L. 16.)  This 
gave Mr. Peer a range of unidentifiable purchases attributable to Hallam, which 
he combined with the identifiable purchases.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 10-18, p. 
40, L. 13 – p. 41, L. 16; Aug. pp. 16-17.)  By combining these figures, Mr. Peer 
ultimately concluded that Hallam made total unauthorized purchases in a range 
of $30,787 to $34,867.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 9-16; Aug. pp. 16-17.) 
In light of all of the above, the district court had substantial evidence—
grounded in facts, opinions, financial records, reports of in-person interviews, and 
Mr. Peer’s meticulous review of some $45,000 worth of receipts—to support its 
conclusions that Hallam was responsible for $21,701 in identifiable purchases, 
and for unidentifiable purchases in a range of $12,386 to $16,466, minus 
legitimate travel purchases, for a total of $30,787 to $34,867.  (Aug. p. 8.)  The 
district court awarded the lesser of the two numbers. (Supp. R., pp. 11-13.)  
Based on the substantial evidence before the district court, it did so correctly.  
 
D. Hallam Fails To Show That The District Court Relied Solely On The 
Testimony Of Mr. Peer, And Fails To Show The Restitution Evidence Was 
Insubstantial Or Speculative 
 
 Hallam claims that “[t]he district court based the restitution amount solely 
on the testimony of Mr. Peer,” and further argues that “decision is not based on 
substantial, competent evidence,” but based on speculation.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 9-13.)  These claims miss the mark, because the district court did not rely 
solely on Mr. Peer’s testimony.  Moreover, the evidence before the district court 
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was substantial, and not speculative.  Hallam accordingly fails to show that the 
district court erred. 
Hallam’s claim that the district court based its restitution award “solely on 
the testimony of Mr. Peer” is mistaken, because the district court considered the 
testimony of three witnesses, as well as “in excess of 50 pages of 
documentation” already in the court file.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 1, Ls. 11-17.)  The 
district court considered all of this evidence, as shown by the written opinion and 
the hearing.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 1, L. 11 – p. 2, L. 2; Aug. pp. 5-10.)  Hallam’s claim 
that the district court relied on one witness is therefore incorrect. 
Hallam also mistakenly argues that the identifiable purchases portion of 
the award is not supported by substantial evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  
She claims the district court lacked a required “individual accounting” to tie those 
purchases to her, because “the State did not submit any receipts for 
unauthorized purchases and did not provide evidence of the specific amount for 
any purchases.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)    
This argument fails, because Hallam cites no authority that requires the 
state submit a receipt-by-receipt, lobster-by-lobster accounting of the $21,701 
worth of identifiable purchases at issue here.  Nor do the rules of evidence 
require such an undertaking; instead, I.R.E. 1006 allows parties to admit charts, 
summaries, or calculations summarizing “the contents of voluminous writings . . . 
which cannot conveniently be examined in court.” This is precisely what 
happened here: rather than admit every receipt into evidence, the state admitted 
Mr. Peer’s restitution memorandum summarizing his review of the relevant bank 
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statements, the approximately $45,000 worth of “the detailed receipts that [he] 
had,” and his multiple subsequent inquiries with Ms. Muller.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 33, 
L. 24 – p. 34, L. 6, p. 44, L. 23 – p. 46, L. 20, p. 49, L. 25 – p. 50, L.4.)5  Hallam 
did not object to that memorandum at the hearing, or even argue that Mr. Peer’s 
summary of the voluminous evidence he reviewed was insufficient.  To the extent 
she now challenges that summary, for lack of receipts, that argument fails. 
Regarding unidentifiable purchases, Hallam contends that “the award for 
‘food and sundries’ is not supported by substantial, competent evidence,” and in 
particular claims that Mr. Peer’s conclusions were speculative.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 12-13.)6  This argument also fails, because, to the extent that Mr. Peer 
                                            
5 The PSI corroborated his testimony and memorandum, as it is replete with Mr. 
Peer’s handwritten notes from his interviews with Ms. Muller, showing how 
thorough his reviews and interviews were.  (PSI, pp. 66 (“18. Lint lizard – NO 19. 
Car charger – for cell? – NO 20. Digital camera – NO. 21. Laptop stand – NO . . . 
.”).) Moreover, Mr. Peer’s and Ms. Brandau’s testimony about what the receipts 
contained was likewise admissible per Idaho Code § 19-5304(6). 
6 Hallam also makes the particular point that “[t]he Bureau of Labor Statistics 
report, also listed expenditures for ‘food away from home’; despite the fact that 
Mr. Peer concluded that [the] Muller household ‘took all their meals at home,’ he 
added an additional $70 to the monthly amount.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  If this 
is a claimed error, it appears to simply be a misunderstanding of Mr. Peer’s 
calculations.  Mr. Peer testified that: 
 
[BLS] indicated that a family of two on average during the 2011-12 
year would have a monthly food expenditure of $260. They also 
identified a factor which they called “food away from home,” that is 
eating out, that sort of thing, which they said a family of two would 
be $120 a month. Since Ms. Muller and her father didn’t go out to 
eat, I tried to adjust that back to what the appropriate amount had 
they eaten at home would be. I’ve assumed that the food eating out 
is at least twice what it would cost to buy the same amount of food 
for home, so I’ve added $70 for what I’ll call “food at home.” A 
total of $330 for food. 
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opined about unidentifiable purchases—that is, food and sundries that could 
arguably be attributed either to Ms. Muller or to Hallam—he essentially gave 
expert opinion testimony, as he was qualified to do.  Such opinions may be 
based on facts and data made known to an expert, and “[i]f of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order 
for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”  I.R.E. 702, 703. 
Here, Mr. Peer presented exactly such expert testimony at the restitution 
hearing. Mr. Peer held an undergraduate degree in mathematics, an MBA, a 
master’s degree in taxation, and was a former CPA, CFO, and CEO.  (08/28/15 
Tr., p. 28, L. 4 – p. 29, L. 4.)  His qualifications were not objected to, and Hallam 
stipulated to admitting Mr. Peer’s restitution memorandum into evidence.  
(08/28/15 Tr., p. 27, L. 12 – p. 29, L. 10.).  That memorandum and his testimony 
contained a “professional opinion based upon [Mr. Peer’s] training and previous 
work as a CPA” and the facts and data of this case.  (08/28/15 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 12-
23.)  In sum, Mr. Peer compiled, reviewed, analyzed, and relied on the 
substantial data he had, as well as a statistical report and his own accounting 
                                                                                                                                  
(08/28/15 Tr., p. 38, L. 25 – p. 39, L. 13 (emphasis added); see also Aug. p. 15.)  
Thus, it is plain from Mr. Peer’s testimony that he did not spuriously add $70 to 
the “food away from home category,” but rather added it to the wholly separate 
“food at home” category. This makes sense because, logically, if the Muller 
family was not eating out at all, they were necessarily eating at home more than 
a family who ate out periodically. An upward adjustment of $70 to the “food at 
home category,” while reducing the “food away from home” category by $120, 
reflects this. In any event, to this extent this criticism is a claimed error, it falters, 
because Hallam appears to misapprehend what Mr. Peer did. 
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techniques, to arrive at a professional opinion regarding unidentifiable purchases.  
Such an expert opinion is appropriate, and Hallam fails to show otherwise. 
Hallam likewise cannot show that Mr. Peer’s testimony was speculative 
per Straub.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  Her argument here fails, because as she 
notes, the Straub Court was dealing with uncertain future losses—such as lost 
future wages, and potential increased insurance premiums—as opposed to 
actual economic loss.  Straub, 153 Idaho at 890, 292 P.3d at 281.  That logic 
distinguishes Straub from this case, where Hallam made charges, over a 17-
month period, using the victims’ credit cards.  Hallam did not argue that she did 
not use the cards, nor did she contest the total amount of charges that Mr. Peer 
testified to.  Further, the district court was able to determine the amount of 
unauthorized charges attributable to Hallam based on the substantial evidence 
before it.  Thus, the expenses in this case are defined, actual, and quantifiable, 
and are not speculative or forward-looking in the Straub-sense.  
While Straub would not apply in this case, the Lombard case, which 
Hallam cites to, is far more applicable. There, the Court of Appeals recognized 
that “[i]n embezzlement cases such as this, where employee theft has spanned a 
long period of time, there are inherent challenges involving the estimation of the 
actual stolen amount.”  State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 823, 242 P.3d 189, 193 
(Ct. App. 2010).  The Lombard Court noted that there “the exact amount of [the 
defendant’s] theft cannot be determined with absolute certainty,” but 
nevertheless upheld the restitution award because the store-owner victim “used 
the best evidence available to him under the circumstances to determine the 
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probable stolen amount.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals found that “[a]lthough the 
amount of loss was based on a statistical model, this model itself was based on 
evidence on the record,” and concluded the district court’s restitution award was 
supported by substantial, competent evidence.  Id. at 824, 242 P.3d at 194.  
Here, those same challenges were present, as Hallam had permission to use the 
credit cards to a limited extent, but exceeded those boundaries by making 
thousands of dollars in unapproved purchases.  Nevertheless, Mr. Peer’s method 
of estimating the range in which she made unauthorized purchases was based 
on the evidence in the record and thus, per Lombard, was appropriate. 
The district court relied on Mr. Peer’s testimony and the other substantial 
evidence in the record in fashioning the restitution award.  It did so correctly. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment and 
restitution order of the district court. 
 DATED this 9th day of June, 2016. 
 
 
 
      __/s/ Kale D. Gans_____ 
      KALE D. GANS 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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